Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent posted on X on April 22 that Iranian crude storage at Kharg Island would be full within days, forcing Iran’s oil wells offline. The prediction was wrong. Iran had spent a decade expanding its storage infrastructure and held 127 million barrels of floating reserve capacity that U.S. public assessments did not account for. Production continued. So did the revenue.
Bessent’s confidence was grounded in real data. Satellite imagery showed Kharg Island storage rising by more than 6 million barrels between April 13 and April 21, a pace consistent with a terminal approaching capacity under the U.S. naval blockade. At that point, onshore storage at Kharg sat at approximately 74 percent of its stated 30 million barrel capacity. Storage managers generally avoid exceeding 80 percent for safety and operational flexibility. On paper, the math supported Bessent’s call.
What the assessment missed was total system capacity. Iran had added 2 million barrels of onshore storage at Kharg as recently as May 2025, bringing tanks back online after refurbishment. Additional terminals at Jask and Qeshm Island had been developed over the prior two years. Floating storage — tankers anchored off China, Malaysia, and Singapore — added another 127 million barrels beyond the blockade’s reach. Iran also proactively curtailed production before tanks filled completely, avoiding the hard shutdown Bessent described.
The revenue pipeline kept running. Since February 28, United Against Nuclear Iran tracked 84 Iranian oil loadings totaling approximately 86 million barrels. At elevated wartime oil prices, UANI estimated that generated more than $6 billion for the IRGC. As of June 2, 41 ghost fleet tankers were anchored or loitering openly near Malaysia’s offshore transfer zone, continuing ship-to-ship transfers to Chinese teapot refineries without meaningful interruption.
The intelligence failure is specific. U.S. tracking accurately captured storage levels rising at Kharg. What it underestimated was the full system — expanded onshore infrastructure, alternative terminals, and floating reserves Iran built across a decade of sanctions pressure. Iran had run this playbook before. During COVID-19, Kharg storage reached 90 percent capacity without triggering a production collapse. The institutional knowledge existed in Tehran. The public U.S. assessment did not reflect it.
On June 11, Trump posted on Truth Social that the U.S. would assume total control of Iran’s oil and gas industries, including Kharg Island. He called off new strikes hours later.
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